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Abstract.  Data logs about learning activities are being recorded at a growing 
pace due to the adoption and evolution of educational technologies (Edtech). 
Data analytics has entered the field of education under the name of learning an-
alytics. Data analytics can provide insights that can be used to enhance learning 
activities for educational stakeholders, as well as helping online learning appli-
cations providers to enhance their services. However, despite the goodwill in 
the use of Edtech, some service providers use it as a means to collect private da-
ta about the students for their own interests and benefits. This is showcased in 
recent cases seen in media of bad use of students’ personal information. This 
growth in cases is due to the recent tightening in data privacy regulations, espe-
cially in the EU. The students or their parents should be the owners of the in-
formation about them and their learning activities online. Thus they should have 
the right tools to control how their information is accessed and for what purpos-
es.  Currently, there is no technological solution to prevent leaks or the misuse 
of data about the students or their activity. It seems appropriate to try to solve it 
from an automation technology perspective. In this paper, we consider the use 
of Blockchain technologies as a possible basis for a solution to this problem. 
Our analysis indicates that the Blockchain is not a suitable solution.  Finally, we 
propose a cloud-based solution with a central personal point of management 
that we have called Personal Data Broker. 
Keywords: Blockchain, Smart Contracts, Learning Analytics, Educational Data 
Mining, Academic Analytics, Data Privacy, Digital Identity, Moodle. 
1 Introduction 
Learning Analytics has become a key tool for assessment [1]. The students’ inter-
actions within online learning environments are collected, processed by statistical 
models, and finally presented to teachers and other stakeholders. These results are 
growing in detail and complexity. The student’s personal data is generated from inter-
actions in Learning Management Systems (LMS) [2, 3]. That data is analyzed by 
Amo, D. [et al.]. Personal data broker instead of blockchain for students’ data privacy assurance. 
"Advances in intelligent systems and computing", 2019, vol. 932, p. 371-380.
The final authenticated version is available online at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16187-3_36
2 
algorithms and afterwards visualized by stakeholders in dashboards [4]. This helps to 
provide insights about behavior and learning needs [5]. These enhanced results enable 
teachers to better understand the progress of students and other related educational 
context aspects [6], such as validity of resources or even assignments. Hence, analyt-
ics have become essential to understand the students, get actionable recommendations 
[7] or even predict patterns of learning [8]. 
This paper is structured in four further sections. In section 2, we introduce the ob-
jectives, the research question and the methodology used. In section 3 we introduce 
the fundamentals and argument that Blockchain is a novel technology which still has 
some security flaws that makes it an unreliable protocol in terms of data privacy. In 
Section 4, we introduce an alternative solution to ensure students’ data privacy and its 
architecture in the cloud, which we call Personal Data Broker. Section 5 concludes 
and closes the paper and describes future works. 
2 Methodology  
In the Learning Analytics process, different tools are used to collect private, per-
sonal and highly sensitive data from students, even from minors. This data collection 
generates privacy issues related to data leakages and misuses. The collected data can 
be stored in unknown servers, making it possible for administrators without legal 
permissions to access them. Moreover, even if the logs could be stored in the same 
students’ institution, the data inside the logs cannot be trusted due to possible altera-
tions by system administrators. This context generates fears against the use of educa-
tional analytical approximations. Some data misuses such as inBloom schools case [9] 
highlight the importance of respecting students’ privacy. They also manifest the ur-
gency of finding a definitive and global solution to student data protection.  
 
Fig. 1. Data privacy problem treated by law under supposition of good will. 
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Current solutions are delivered as policies, such as General Data Protection Regu-
lation (GDPR) laws and regulations [10]. There are also research results in form of 
frameworks, good practice guides or principles [11–14]. Policies, regulations or 
guidelines do not correct the problem from its root because they do not prevent data 
leakages or misuses in real time. They are only applied when the problem has oc-
curred and someone has reported it. Moreover, policies assume that the intentions of 
each of the stakeholder are in the interests of the students –see figure 1-, but reality 
shows that this is not always the case [5, 9]. Laws, regulations, and principles are not 
enough to assure data privacy in any kind of educational data log created by Learning 
Analytics, Academic Analytics, Educational Data Mining -or even other no analytical 
tools-. Therefore, there is a fragility in educational data privacy that needs to be ad-
dressed. 
This situation can be solved by support the legislation with a layer of automation 
technology to enforce their policies and regulations in real time. This new approach 
could safeguard the privacy of students’ data in its current and future uses. Some 
emerging technologies such as Blockchain seem to be strong candidates to ensure 
privacy and secure sensible data of students. The use of Smart Contracts inside 
Blockchain allows the automation of legal actions. They could be executed as soon as 
irregularities are detected in the use or collection of data. However, there is an ongo-
ing academic debate and growing research on the security and privacy of the Block-
chain [15–18]. The Blockchain approximation might not be ready to ensure data pri-
vacy in educational contexts. 
Our hypothesis is that Blockchain is not the best technology to protect and manage 
safe access to personal data in the educational context. Consequently, the main pur-
pose of this manuscript is double. On the one hand, we show the limitations of Block-
chain as a possible solution to the problem posed. On the other hand, we present an 
alternative solution to Blockchain. 
To achieve the objectives and validate the hypothesis, we propose to expose the 
weaknesses of Blockchain related to the privacy and data security dimensions in the 
educational context. As a guide to formulating a suitable methodology, we launch the 
research question: Is the Blockchain a suitable technology to ensure data privacy for 
students? We find publications that are motivated by the upward trend of Blockchain's 
use, advocate the use of it in education [19]. However, there are studies based on the 
very foundations of Blockchain that question it as a private and secure technology 
[20–24]. All of them repeat a series of security flaws that can be included in different 
categories: Identity filtering, Lack of transactional privacy, Private Key insecurity, 
Vulnerabilities in Smart Contracts, Discovery of user identities and Quantum compu-
ting. 
 
3 Blockchain fundamentals 
Satoshi Nakamoto [25] announced a cryptographic solution to a number of game 
theory problems. This would also allow the creation of a peer-to-peer electronic cash 
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system. After that, Nakamoto open sourced the implementation of the solution for the 
cryptocurrency Bitcoin introducing Blockchain as a cryptographic networked plat-
form. Since then, Blockchain has attracted different opinions in education. This plat-
form implemented a distributed ledger managed by consensus with a four core char-
acteristics [26, 27]. Such characteristics are both the strengths and weaknesses of 
Blockchain: 
 
1. Immutability: When a block is added, it cannot be altered. This data persistence 
and irreversibility creates trust in the transaction ledger. 
2. Decentralized: Each user of the network has a copy of all the transactions. All 
the data is distributed through the network and decentralized. 
3. Consensus Driven: Data is validated through cryptographic proof-of-work. 
Hence, no central authority is needed nor trusted. 
4. Transparent: All transactions are public and history records are accessed by an-
yone in the network. Hence, users’ data is public.  
 
3.1 Consensus and permission-less 
Blockchain is permission-less by default. No one needs a special permission, nor a 
central authority, to access the Blockchain users’ network. In a context with untrusted 
users, where data is decentralized and no central authority is required, a solution was 
needed to assure data integrity. Blockchain solved this problem. Each transaction in 
the Blockchain must be validated by consensus [25]. A network of peers that perform 
cryptographic calculations achieves this consensus when each peer validates the 
transaction by proof-of-work. The proof-of-work consists in solving a cryptographic 
algorithm using intensive computation power. If the majority of the network that has 
completed the proof of work says a transaction is valid, then it is. The peers validating 
transactions are called “miners” because they get monetary rewards depending on the 
computing power they commit – linked to the energy they consume – and random-
ness. 
Although Blockchain seems to be a secure and private technology, there are some 
factors that support the criticism and skepticism it has received in education that make 
it unsuitable as a form of safeguarding data privacy. Blockchain is adequate for data 
and transaction trustworthiness, certification and validation by consensus. However, 
data privacy in Blockchain is not fully assured by design. Blockchain, as stated by 
Nakamoto, is only anonymous until the public key is shared. Therefore, Blockchain is 
pseudonymous and arises some insecurities about data privacy in it. 
Considering that it is possible to link the public key to a real person, any user in 
Blockchain could discover real identities. Although users’ data can be encrypted in 
Blockchain, users’ real identity can be discovered through different attack techniques 
[28–30]. Hence, Blockchain is a novel technology that needs a new design approach 
and definition to assure users’ data privacy in Blockchain. 
 
3.2 Limitations in permission-less architecture 
Blockchain has a permission-less design. Such designs presents some limitations [28]: 
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1. Sequential execution: Blockchain platforms, such as Ethereum, can execute 
Smart Contracts. For each transaction, each Smart Contract is executed sequen-
tially in each and every node of the network. In some cases, it can provoke a De-
nial of Service when the execution takes too long. 
2. Non-deterministic execution: Non-deterministic execution does not assure the 
same results. In a Blockchain network, this can lead to ambiguous results. 
3. Execution on all nodes: This is at odds with confidentiality, given that each and 
every node has to execute the smart contracts. These should only be executed in 
the granted contracts. 
4. Privacy-invasive: Blockchain transactions and data are public. The ledger is dis-
tributed to all nodes, so all users have the same data. This situation is clearly pri-
vacy-invasive for many use-cases. Although data in blocks is encrypted, each and 
every user of the Blockchain network has the same data. This data can be export-
ed and decrypted in the future where decrypting conditions could be optimal. 
5. Hard-coded consensus: The consensus protocol is hard-coded to any Blockchain 
service. Thus, is very difficult, if not impossible, to change without any recoding 
or code refactoring. 
 
These limitations could affect the performance and efficiency of possible automatic 
legal enforcements in the Blockchain. This automation will be executed in every node 
by smart contracts, which could result in a potential bottleneck. Moreover, the hard-
coded consensus cannot be reprogrammed quickly enough to assure data trustworthi-
ness. This could lead to a situation where data in Blockchain is not reliable. Hence, 
Blockchain is not suitable to automatically enforcing legal controls, principles and 
good practices for data privacy agreements. 
 
3.3 Data immutability 
Data immutability in Blockchain is a problem due to: 
 
1. Privacy-invasion: If each user of the Blockchain network has the same data and 
this data can be exported, better decryption conditions can release real data and 
expose it to non-permitted users. 
2. Bureaucracy in itself: The users’ network of Blockchain is the central bureau-
cracy in itself. The Blockchain exists if there are enough users to validate data, as 
in the networks of centered authorities 
3. Need of a database: If the word “Blockchain” can be substituted by “database” 
inside a text without losing any sense, maybe what is needed is a database instead 
of a Blockchain. Future needs may arise to change the data inside the Blockchain. 
These could be solved using links to data storage services such as Drobox or 
Google drive. However, links to data may change in the future. New services 
could appear with new and stronger encryption algorithms or current outdated da-
ta storage services y disappear. 
 
Blockchain is about data immutability and unbreakable encryption algorithms. 
What will happen when ultrahigh computing systems are able to break encryption of 
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such encrypted data? Standard cryptographic systems are known to be vulnerable 
[31]. Eventually, it will be impossible to ensure data privacy. Such a consequence will 
be unacceptable for any Blockchain user. The data will be immutable as long as we 
live in a computational power era in equilibrium with the hard-coded consensus pro-
tocol. Hence, data privacy is not assured. 
4 Solution and architecture 
In the area of learning analytics, both digital artifacts and real devices are involved. 
Digital artifacts involve all virtual learning environments. Real devices involve all 
those that allow to take biometric data or measure body actions such as face detection, 
sweating, body position or even “graphological”. Both could potentially collect stu-
dents’ private data. All collected data is stored in logs. These logs may be physically 
stored in the educational institution in which they are generated. However, depending 
on the platforms used, the data may be stored on the servers of the companies that 
provide them. These storages keep personal data of students, including minors. There-
fore, data privacy in learning analytics is a sensitive issue –the same for other contexts 
where educational data is traced, collected, stored and used in some manners. 
The fragility in data privacy is a problem within learning analytics. It generates 
fears and feelings against its use. In this sense, different proposals have been devel-
oped to ensure the privacy of data and ensure the digital identity of students. We find 
policy frameworks such as DELICATE, principles and rules of good practice such as 
Sheila Project or LALA Community, or even European laws such as the General 
Regulation of Data Protection and other specific ones depending on the country such 
as the Organic Law on the Protection of Personal Data in Spain. These privacy poli-
cies and agreements are contingent upon good-doing. Consequently, the approach of 
ensuring the privacy of data bylaws or policies is dysfunctional, since it assumes that 
institutions, companies or workers will behave in a correct manner. Reality shows that 
there are misuses of personal data collected in processes of learning analytics. The 
most dramatic case was the closure of inBloom schools, which shared personal data 
of students to third parties without parental consent. Even in other areas, there are 
data leaks such as the Cambridge Analytics from Facebook. 
It is necessary to develop an approach that addresses the problem from its design 
and creation. It is necessary for laws to be applied before or at the time of data mis-
use. Consequently, the study and generation of a technological framework of architec-
ture and concrete rules to allow the automation of policies, laws, principles and good 
practices in a safe and interoperable environment is required. The solution has to be: 
 
1. Centrally managed: Distributed data in a public ledger is not suitable to assure 
data privacy and real anonymity. A central platform required to enable students to 
manage their data. 
2. Data Link based: Private and personal data do not have to be stored in the solu-
tion. The solution has to be a gate to the data where students can use any plat-
form. 
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3. Interoperable: Has to be able to communicate with different platforms to collect 
data and perform CRUD (Create, Read, Update, and Delete) actions. 
4. Secure and reliable: The architecture has to be reliable and the data behind it 
have to be secured and not accessible without any consent. The slightest failure 
can raise the same fears and angst as those that appeared in Learning Analytics. 
5. Scalable: Private and personal data of so many students from all connected plat-
forms could be considered as Big Data. The architecture of the solution has to 
provide mechanisms to scale in time with interoperability with different plat-
forms. 
6. Automated agreements: The data privacy agreements between students and enti-
ties have to be enforced automatically to provide real time checking. In addition, 
the laws, the regulations and all the policies involved have to be checked auto-
matically in real time. 
 
Hence, the solution has to be a technological mechanism to automatically enforce 
policy and private data agreements. 
 
4.1 Personal Data Broker 
The idea of the Personal Data Broker (PDB) is to mediate between entities -such as 
students and universities-. This figure 2 activates different abilities for the students: 
A) Store the data wherever they want (logs, portfolios, certificates, qualifications ...) 
and in whichever technology they want (relational databases, xAPI Learning Record 
Stores, cloud storage services, etc.); B) Automate privacy agreements between enti-
ties; C) Decide the CRUD actions to be taken and how long to activate them for cer-
tain entities; D) Allow to read encrypted or open data. Our narrative of the PDB 
mechanism reads: “An entity that links to student data which incorporates different 
privacy agreements related to the relationships students have with different entities. It 
is able to allow the access, modification or storage of their data. These actions are 
determined by the privacy agreements." 
 
 
Fig. 2. Personal Data Broker Scheme. 
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4.2 Smart Contracts for automation and Blockchain for trustable context 
Digital automation technologies such as Smart Contracts are candidates for study. 
Their use can make the interoperable and secure framework of automation of policies, 
laws, and principles of good practices a reality. Smart Contracts automate business 
rules between two entities. This technology is based on short programs whose activa-
tion depends on specific conditions. These conditions are found in the privacy agree-
ments or policies between entities, such as agreements between universities and stu-
dents. Hence, Smart Contracts are applicable in this solution. 
In educational contexts, smart contracts can be used to enforce regulations, laws, 
principles and good practices to ensure students’ data privacy. The use of Blockchain 
as a certification mechanism between entities could prove interesting as it could gen-
erate trust in the educational context while preserving private and personal data with 
PDB at the same time. In no case would Blockchain be used to protect the privacy of 
students. 
5 Conclusions 
Analytics in education is a growing aspect in educational technology. The results 
are very useful for stakeholders and tools providers and be used to enhance education 
and learning processes in many different ways, as other studies have demonstrated 
[32–34]. Despite of improvements, students’ personal and private data is being ex-
posed, shared and traded by the same service and tools providers. Regulations, ethics, 
laws, principles and good practices are not enough to stop data leaks and misuse. The 
personal and private data collected from students also includes data from minors. 
Therefore, it is a sensitive issue. There is an urgent need to develop a solution that can 
leverage the technology to automate those regulations and principles to enable real-
time detection. The solution has to assure students’ data privacy and respect the pri-
vacy agreements between students and educational entities. 
Emergent technologies such as Blockchain seemed to be a potential solution. In 
this paper, we argued that Blockchain is a novel technology with some security flaws 
by design that turns it an unreliable protocol in terms of data privacy. Hence, is not a 
suitable technology to assure data privacy in the educational context. 
Smart contracts can automate data privacy agreements between entities, such as 
students and educational institutions. We propose an alternate solution to Blockchain 
that uses smart contracts, is cloud based, enables law automation and assures the data 
privacy of students and respects privacy agreements. We call it Personal Data Broker 
(PDB), which enables students to take control and manage their own data and decide 
who and when can make create, read, update, and delete actions. 
We are now working on the implementation of PDB in Moodle to save logs outside 
the LMS, in real time, and to provide a layer of security to users’ private data. The 
results of this ongoing and other future work will be published in article format. 
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